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In early October, prime ministerial candidate Justin Trudeau promised Canadians “a full and open public 
debate” on the Trans-Pacific Partnership. With 30 chapters that would bind Canada to sweeping 
agreements on everything from services to intellectual property to the environment to procurement, there 
is much to debate. 
 
One deserving a public discussion is the investment chapter, which includes an investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) mechanism that allows foreign investors to sue state parties for violating broad investor 
protections contained in the agreement. 
Of course, ISDS is not new to Canadian treaties. Canada has been sued many times under such 
mechanisms. But if that weren’t enough to give Canadians pause, a few other recent developments 
should. 
First, the bulk of Canada’s investment treaties to date have been reached with developing countries, 
where Canada’s main interest has been to provide the greatest privileges it could negotiate for its own 
investors without assuming too much risk of fielding incoming claims. Along with other recent 
agreements, such as those with China and the European Union, the TPP expands such rights to a much 
larger number of inward investors. 
Second, the dozens of times that Canada has already been sued, largely under the North American free-
trade agreement, show that private arbitrators have been very willing to second-guess Canadian policy-
makers and administrative enforcement, extracting damage awards. While Canadian governments have 
insisted that the tribunals have gotten it wrong on many issues, they have had little recourse. 
Indeed, there have been mounting concerns about ISDS and its ability to challenge legitimate policy. TPP 
negotiators assured the global public that the deal addressed these concerns. After its public release, we 
can see that this is not the case. In some areas, we see a further evisceration of the role of domestic policy, 
institutions and constituents, and greater liabilities for governments and domestic stakeholders. 
For instance, the treaty partners assured the public that language “underscores that countries retain the 
right to regulate in the public interest, including on health, safety, the financial sector and the 
environment.” That provision, however, is subject to compliance with all of the other investor protections 
in the chapter, fully negating the preservation of policy space. Only a handful of very specific measures – 
those related to tobacco control and taxation, for instance – are selectively excluded from arbitration. This 
means that the types of public-interest measures that have been challenged in Canada, including efforts to 
enforce environmental obligations or to restrict hydraulic fracturing, and court decisions invalidating 
pharmaceutical patents, remain at risk of continued challenges by foreign investors. 
Many of the concerns about how ISDS favours foreign investors over broader public interests are based 
on the increasing use of the “fair and equitable treatment” standard. Under the guise of improving the 
FET provision, the TPP drafters did exactly the opposite; the TPP now codifies the approach many 
arbitrators have been taking by allowing investors’ “expectations” to be a key factor in determining 
whether a government has breached its obligations. If an investor’s “expectations,” which may be based 
on general statements of government officials or promotional materials used to attract investors, are then 
not met, they can sue for damages. This is precisely how a tribunal held Canada liable under NAFTA in 
the Nova Scotia Bilcon decisionthis year. 
 
Bilcon also illustrates how the non-discrimination standards in these treaties – originally aimed at 
preventing countries from discriminating against foreign investors on the basis of nationality – are now 
being used to challenge anygovernment action that might impact an investor. 
In Bilcon, the investors successfully claimed that Canada had violated the national treatment obligation 
because the government had denied an environmental permit for a controversial mining project while 
other projects were allowed to proceed. The fact that those other projects were in different locations, 
environments and communities was not persuasive to the tribunal. Investors are now using non-
discrimination protections to challenge basic regulatory decisions and to prevent the strengthening of 
environmental and other standards over time. The new TPP language does not prevent that practice. 
Importantly, Canada’s legal system has evolved to promote investment within Canada by protecting the 
rights of investors (and other stakeholders) from improper treatment by the government, giving them 
various rights of action in domestic courts and administrative processes. However, to balance those rights, 
the Canadian domestic legal system has also evolved to preserve the fundamental need for government to 
regulate investment to protect health, safety, security and other public interests. 
ISDS allows foreign investors to bypass that very balance. By allowing them to selectively challenge 
basic contract, administrative or regulatory issues in a parallel process, ISDS undermines the agencies, 
courts and policy-makers that shape Canadian domestic law. Indeed, a forthcoming analysis shows that 
less than 20 per cent of the 34 claims filed against Canada under NAFTA would have any case for 
damages in domestic courts, and only half of those would have had an arguable case for the equivalent 
damages. 
Many of us were hoping for a 21st-century agreement, enshrining our shared goals for global 
development while buttressing the policies, legal frameworks, democratic processes, transparent national 
courts and administrative systems of member countries. Alas, the TPP’s investment chapter has left a 
gaping hole, leaving member states – and their citizens – at the brink. 
